In order to classify an economy into two citegories --"small" and "not small" --one obviously needs two things: an index or measure of the size of an economy according to some concept of size, and a cut-off point with respect to this index so that all economies with an index value at or below this cut-off value are classified as small. In the theory of international trade the concept of size is market power, i.e. the ability of an economy to affect its own terms of trade by changing its volume of trade, and the cut-off point is zero. As an operational concept, this is not very useful --apart from the problems in empirically determining whether a country has market power, the fact that such power may be commodity-specific (that is, a country may have positive market power in some commodity markets but none in others) makes it difficult to generalize it into an economy-wide concept.
Another index of size that has been proposed is the size of a country's potential market for commodities and services measured in terms of the country's real gross national product (GNP) or better still, gross domestic expenditure (GDE). Of course, it is recognized that a poor tountry --in the sense of having a low per capita income --may still be large in terms of its GNP because of its large population but small as a potential market. For example, if the income distribution is not unduly concentrated, the bulk of the large population in such a low per capita income economy will be too poor to be potential demanders of anything but basic commodities.
This has been taken to imply that an index of market size for manufactured goods has to be related to the total consumption of such goods which in turn has to be based on population, per capita income and some measure of the concentration of the distribution of income. If one goes beyond the market for manufactured goods to basic services covering transportation, health and sanitation, edu2ation, etc., then the geographical area of a country, the average density of its population settlements, a measure of distribution of the density across settlements, and even the agesex distribution of population become relevant as possible determinants of the size of the market for such services.
In an ever-changing world the definition of smallness may also have to change, particularly in response to technological change. For instance, the "optimum" size of a plant for producing ammonia (an input in the manufacture of nitrogenous fertilizers) increased with the development of high pressure compressors.
Given the vagueness of the concept and the arbitrariness inevitably involved in choosing an index of size and a cut-off point with respect to this index, the literature on "small" economies appears to have settled on a country's population as the primary measure of size, with total GNP as a secondary measure, rather than attempting to develop anything more sophisticated. The population cut-off point in defining smallness has been set anywhere between 1.5 million to 5 million. Ir cross-country regression analysis of development processes Chenery and Syrquin 1/ use population as a measure of size or scale of an economy, and countries with less than 5 million population are classified by them as small.
1/
Chenery and Syrquin (1975). --For the 33 small economies 6 are considered low-income while 7 are upper-middle-income.
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II. Problems of Small Economies
Among the international organizations, UNCTAD has probably devoted (D) Problems of access to markets for exports and in particular to external capital markets. It can be argued, however, that these problems are in fact a reflection of the above points (1) and (3).
(E) Problems of limited policy independence, particularly in respect of macro-economic policies relating to exchange rates, monetary policy, etc.
(F) Problems of real income comparisons.
A. Economies of Scale
The exploitation of economies of scale in the manufacture of goods traded in international markets need not, of course, be constrained by the limitations imposed by the small size of the domestic market. However, to the extent remoteness i.tcreases the cost of transportation to the world markets, the returns from manufacture for exports are reduced relative to more favorably located competitors. On the other hand, the same factor provides greater natural protection for import-substituting manufacture. Be that as it may, even if there are no constraints on size of the market for a product because of possibilities for export, to the extent the penetration into foreign markets depends on the experience gained in producing and selling in the domestic market, smallness of the latter may preclude export development. Since market size for this purpose is not measured just by the size of a country's population, and is not directly related to its status as an island or its being landlocked, a similar problem arises in any country (small or large) with a limited domestic market. The significance of this problem is, in the final analysis, an empirical matter. The analysis of Chenery and Syrquin (1975) suggests that there are substantial differences even among small countries in their sources and patterns of industrializations, with some successfully industrialized small countries having a composition of exports similar to that of large countries even though they depend on trade to a greater extent. In primary-product-oriented small countries, on the other hand, they found that industrialization takes place later and is due to import-substitution and perhaps to inapprop7iate policies as well. l/ 1/ In the study of the "Growth Experience of Small Economies", Metzler and Hughes found that there was no "significant correlation (positive or negative) of scale with growth for small and large countries", see Jalan (ed.) (1982), p, 91 .
-12 -It has been suggested that indivisibilities and consequent economies of scale in the production of internationally non-traded goods and services (particularly those relating to infrastructure) have the effect of raising unit cost, both of capacity creation and of production in small economies.
For instance, it has been estimated that small countries experience an average of 65 percent cost disadvantage in creating additional thermal capacity for 
1/ Legarda (1983).
It is also suggested that indivisibilities in political and administrative structures raise costs for small economies (e.g., a very small and a very large country will each have one President or Prime Minister, the number of ministers and government departments needed to take care of economic development is not proportional to a country's size). On the other hand, it has been argued that there are social and political advantages associated with smallness, e.g., social and political cohesion, and fewer vested interests. The presumption that such vulnerability imposes relatively higher costs on small economies also arises from the fact that the "self-insurance"
available to large economies is not feasible for them. That is to say, a large economy can absorb a local disaster by spreading its cost over the rest economically, domestic production shortfalls due to a natural disaster through imports. In the absence of o¢:her cheaper ways of insurance, the return to such stocking activity can be high. Of course, disruptions in the provision of non-traded and non-storable (e.g., electric power) goods due to a disaster cannot be made good by imports and stock depletion. However, such disruptions are likely to be of relatively short duration. At the same time, the international community has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to provide disaster assistance.
While the potential exists for a small country to insure itself against major losses, and in fact all countries need to undertake some level of insurance against unforeseen negative events, it is also argued that a small and poor economy cannot afford to tie up a volume of resources in buffer stocks of commodities and foreign exchange or purchase insurance sufficient to adequately cover these risks. These forms of insurance do represent a cost to the economy. If the probability of a disaster occurring is high, the corresponding insurance costs will also be high. The net result is that these countries, if they are in fact more vulnerable, are more likely to have to devote more of their available resources to insurance than other countries.
Small economies allegedly suffer increased economic vulnerability because, being necessarily more open than large economies, they are more affected by shocks originating elsewhere in the world. Further, being small and hence specialized in a few exports while widely dispersed in the composition of imports, any external shock that affects the market only for their exports has a disproportionate effect on their economies. Also, a small economy in the sense of not having or not perceiving to have any influence on its own terms of trade does not have the option of adjusting to external demand shocks by varying its optimal export tax. It is of course, true that It is but natural that given a narrow resource base, an economy may specialize in the production of a few commodities and services, although some otherwise small economies (Singapore or Hong Kong, for example) apparently have resources, mainly entrepreneurship and skilled labor, that appear to have enabled them to have a diversified production structure. There are some otherwise large economies which have at least as high a commodity concentration, in their exports if not in their total production. Thus, being small and having a high commodity concentration are not synonymous. In any case, the really important point is that a high commodity concentration, either in export earnings or in domestic production (and in domestic value added), need not imply that the changing fortunes of exports or of domestic production are mirrored in foreign exchange expenditure on imports or in aggregate domestic expenditure. To the extent that an economy invests in an appropriately diversified portfolic of domestic assets (inclusive of inventories) and foreign assets (particularly reserves) expenditures can be more stable than earnings and incomes.
Again the issue is whether the probability of major fluctuations constitute a substantial cost for many of the small and low-income countries which exceeds that imposed on other countries. Furthermore, portfolio choice and management are generally not inexpensive in terms of skills, information needs, access to swift communication channels, etc. And fixed costs involved in setting up the needed institutions may make it prohibitively expensive for "small" economies. One could envision that several "small" countries could share in the costs of setting up and operating such an institution, However, there are numerous political and operational problems to such arrangement which make this an unlikely and unrealistic option for most countries.
Apart from diversification of its financial asset portfolio, an economy may have the option of diversifying its portfolio of human capi:al, i.e., have some of its workers emigrate and remit part of their earnings abroad to their families at home. A number of island economies appear to have a significant proportion of their labor force working abroad.
Appropriate choice and management of the asset portfolio, coupled with the use of international facilities (e.g., the IMF compensatory financing, food facility, STABEX) available to finance temporary (and reversible) shocks and to ease the cost of adjustment to permanent shifts, can reduce the unfavorable effects of external shocks. Given these facilities and small countries' access to them, it is unclear as to ;hether any additional facilities aimed specifically at helping these countries are needed. The small size in combination with remoteness is also likely to lead to stronger tendencies for market imperfections and monopolistic situations in the country itself. This results from the fact that, ceteris paribus, the smaller the market and the higher the transportation costs, the greater the danger that competition will not be effectively felt by individual producers (domestic and foreign) in the small country, thus permitting the producer to capture and exploit a monopolistic position in specific markets. Given this danger, small and remote economies need to be vigilant of this potential and take steps to reduce or prevent its occurrence.
It is undoubtedly true that the high costs of transport can reduce their foreicga trade just as tariff barriers can. One can even show how, in a simple Ricardian model, the introduction of sufficiently high transport costs will eliminate trade altogether. As a consequence, compared to an otherwise identical economy, an unfavorably located island economy will have lower real income. Of course, the cost of its remoteness can be taken into account by appropriately computing real income comparisons (section 6 below discusses these comparisons in some detail) when per capita incomes are being used as a decision criteria, e.g., aid allocation, graduation. Focussing on high transport costs per se, however, ignores the extent to which economies have adapted to these costs by the choice of its export products; a classic example is Switzerland, which produced and exported high value but low weight per unit value products such as watches and instruments.
There is yet another sense in which remoteness is sometimes used. It is argued that many small economies (in particular, dependent territories) are at the remote periphery of the centers of power at which decisions affecting them are made. To the extent such remoteness means less interference from the center, it could have positive effects. In any case, remoteness in this sense is not unique to small island territories --areas within a large economy could be remote from the center of decision-making.
D. Access to Capital Markets
One of the disadvantages from which small economies are said to suffer is their alleged limited access to private external capital. The disadvantageously placed with respect to access to private capital markets, they seem to receive much higher levels of official development assistance on a per capita basis than do many large economies, as is evident from the data presented in Table 4 . 1/ In almost every region, very small and small countries received much higher net official transfers per capita and a larger share in terms of IDA loans than large countries.
1/ An analysis of this small country bias 4n aid allocations is contained in Isenman (1976). But the real issue is whether and to what extent a small country should seek to stabilize income generated and/or prices given the costs which the pursuit of such an objective could impose on a small economy and the practical limits the countries face in the development and maintenance of a diversified portfolio of domestic production and foreign exchange reserves.
In chis context, it has been suggested that policy prescriptions relating to adjustment to external shocks have to be different in the case of small island developing economies. Often this suggestion is based on the belief that in a large, mo-a diversified and less open economy, the effect of shocks will be relatively less severe and the cost of adjustment could be spread to a greater extent within the economy, yet little evidence that this is the case has been presented. Furthermore, the dictum to "finance shocks of a temporary duration and reversible in direction" and "adjust to permanent shifts" applies equally to large and small economies. And the problem of determining whether an observed shock falls into the 'temporary"f or "permanent" category is no easier in the case of large economies!
F. Real Income Comparisons
It was argued in section 3 that the transport cost disadvantages of a remote' economy will be reflected in its real income, properly computed.
Consider, for simplicity, two otherwise identical economies which face the same prices in world markets, one of which is located sufficiently close to these markets that the transport costs of taking its exports to and bringing its imports from these markets can be neglected, while the second is located so far that transport costs preclude its participation in world trade. Assume further that there are no distortions in either economy. Clearly, if the income (i.e., value added) in each of these economies is computed by valuing its net output at the common set of world prices, then the second, which is forced into autarky because of high transportation costs, will have a lower income than the first. The reason being that the first (the second) will have an output composition that approximates the maximum income that can be achieved at world prices (domestic prices) and the two sets of prices differ because of transport costs. Even though in the above argument it is implicit that both countries produce only internationally traded commodities, it can be shown to be valid even when non-traded goods are admitted into the analysis as long as they are valued at prices that equal the value of the inputs used in their production, the input prices being those prevailing in the first economy.
In practice, real incomes in units of a common currency such as the US dollar are often computed by dividing the real income in national currency unit by the official exchange rate (the national currency price) of the US dollar. A number of arguments have been made suggesting that such a procedure -28 -may be biased in some sense or the other against small economies, apart from the general (i.e., not specific to small economies) problem that per capita real national income is not necessarily a good index of the welfare of a country's population or that of its level of economic, social and institutional development. Since this problem is well understood and other indices of social and institutional developments are often-used in conjunction with per capita real income, no further discussion of it is offered here.
It is argued that in many small and poor countries there is a rich expatriate community which may be sufficiently large to pull the per capita income of the residents much above that of resident citizens. However, if valid, this is easily addressed: given an adequate data base, per capita incomes of resident citizens, or for that matter the per capita income of any other sub-group of residents, can be computed.
An apparently more serious argument is that conversion at the official exchange rate understates the transport or other cost disadvantages of small island economies. One could interpret this as asserting that an exchange rate that better reflects these costs will be higher than the official one. The results from the International Comparisons Project funded in part by the World Bank seem to contradict this assertion (see Table 5 ):
the exchange rate derivation index, i.e. the ratio of official exchange rate to the purchasing-power corrected exchange rate is greater than one for all the developing countries included in the project. In other words, allowing for the differing relative purchasing power of currencies, applying a common set of prices representative of the world price structure to the quantities of the commodities and services entering into each country's final expenditure or GDP raises the per capita income of each developing country above the level -29 °T -30 -obtained by using official exchange rates. On the other hand, an alternative interpretation could be that even though the use of official exchange rates instead of the purchasing-power corrected one for conversion understates the "true" income of all developing countries, it understates it less in the case of small island economies so that they appear richer relative to other developing countries than they truly are. If this is valid, the use of purchasing-power corrected exchange rates may make more small economies eligible for various concessions than the use of official exchange rates would suggest. However, there is no evidence that this argument is indeed valid.
In any case, even if data were available (which they are not) for the computation of purchasing-power corrected exchange rates for small island economies, a selective use of such rates for small island economies is obviously out of the question before making that move more locally.
III. Conclusions
It would appear that many (though not all) of the alleged problems of small economies are either not peculiar to small economies or can be addressed through suitable policy measures. It is also the case that the transport cost disadvantage that a small economy suffers because of its location will already be reflected in its real income. As long as operational decisions about a country such as its graduation and its eligibility for various forms of concessions, etc., continue to be-based on flexible applications of a number of indices and criteria and not rigidly on a single index such as that country's per capita real income in US dollars at that official exchange rate, there is little danger that small island or landlocked economies would be unfairly treated. However, this is not to suggest that all is well with small -31 -island or landlocked economies (which clearly they are not, as evidenced by the decline in per capita real GNP in several of them during the 1970s), nor to argue that the external environment for developing countries is currently buoyant. What is being suggested is that causes of economic and social stagnation in some of these economies cannot be attributed to their smallness or similar exogenous characteristics nor to the failure or non-existence of international institutional mechanisms to address their development problems.
